The current geopolitical scenario, redefined by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has transformed European financial institutions into true fronts of hybrid warfare. In this context, Euroclear, the Belgian financial services giant and central securities depository, has emerged as the epicenter of an unprecedented dispute over the management of approximately 193-210 billion euros in assets of the Russian Central Bank, currently frozen under the European Union sanctions regime.1
Euroclear's centrality in the international settlement system has made the company, and particularly its operational leadership represented by CEO Valérie Urbain, the primary target of a complex influence and intimidation operation orchestrated by Russian security apparatus.3 This campaign is not limited to diplomatic or legal pressure, but has manifested through the action of figures within the corporate perimeter, such as French banker Olivier Huby, and through explicit threats of systemic retaliation against states, companies, and individuals.4
The Role of Olivier Huby and Infiltration into the Euroclear Perimeter
The figure of Olivier Huby represents a paradigmatic case study on Russian infiltration capacity into European financial elites. Huby, 68 years old, boasts a very high-profile academic and professional curriculum, having trained at the École nationale des ponts et chaussées in Paris and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States.3
His professional trajectory has intersected diplomacy and international finance, with youthful experiences at French embassies in Prague and Moscow during the Brezhnev era, followed by prominent roles in institutions such as Paribas (now BNP Paribas) and Axa.3 In 1999, Huby co-founded Mfex (Mutual Funds Exchange), a global fund distribution platform that was acquired by Euroclear in 2021.3
Although Huby did not hold a formal managerial or advisory role within the Euroclear group after the acquisition, his position as a member of the Mfex board of directors guaranteed him privileged access to the highest levels of corporate leadership.3 This access was systematically abused to attempt to influence decision-making processes regarding Russian assets, precisely while the European Union was intensifying negotiations with Belgium for the use of interest generated by such funds for military support and reconstruction of Ukraine.3
Investigations conducted by a journalistic consortium comprising EUobserver, Humo, De Morgen, and the Dossier Center revealed that Huby was operating as a de facto intermediary for Russian services, seeking to arrange meetings between CEO Valérie Urbain and Moscow intelligence officers.3
Documentation and Analysis of Trips to Russia (2015-2024)
The most disconcerting element emerging from the analysis of travel data provided by the Dossier Center concerns the intensity of Olivier Huby's physical contacts with Russian territory. Between January 1, 2015, and December 18, 2024, Huby booked a total of 155 flights to and from Russia.3 Such frequency, equivalent to approximately 15 trips per year for a decade, suggests a depth of ties that exceeds any plausible professional or personal motivation related to the European banking sector, especially for an individual without direct operational roles in the Russian market on behalf of Euroclear.3
Geographic analysis of Huby's destinations reveals a pattern of interest spanning from traditional power centers to strategic and industrial zones of Siberia and the Urals. Beyond frequent stops in Moscow and St. Petersburg, Huby regularly visited locations hosting critical infrastructure or industrial complexes linked to Russian defense.
Geographic Distribution of Olivier Huby's Trips
| Location | Strategic Relevance |
|---|---|
| Moscow | Political and financial nerve center; home of the Bolshoi; GRU and SVR headquarters3 |
| St. Petersburg | Second capital and hub for Kremlin-adjacent elites3 |
| Arkhangelsk | Strategic Arctic port; proximity to naval and missile testing bases3 |
| Izhevsk | Center of light weapons production (Kalashnikov Group)3 |
| Kazan | Aviation and technology hub; industrial capital of Tatarstan3 |
| Krasnoyarsk | Siberian industrial center and hub for mining logistics3 |
| Novosibirsk | City of science and technology; important railway and military node3 |
| Tomsk | Academic and Siberian industrial center specialized in engineering3 |
| Yekaterinburg | Capital of the Urals; center of metallurgy and defense-related heavy industry3 |
Huby justified this frenetic travel activity as part of his "private life," citing a passion for Russian ballet and the Bolshoi Theater, of which he claims to be a patron and donor.5 However, this explanation appears fragile to Western intelligence analysts, as it does not justify trips to remote Siberian locations lacking internationally relevant ballet theaters.3
On the contrary, the frequency of flights was considered a "red flag" by security services, leading to suspicion that Huby might be acting as an influence agent or a double agent, exploiting his membership in the Parisian elite to operate in a gray zone between cultural diplomacy and economic espionage.3 Huby's wife, Annette Huby, also made approximately 40 flights to Russia during the same period, sometimes with him and sometimes alone, consolidating the image of a family nucleus deeply integrated into the Russian relational fabric.3
Affiliations and Financial Relationships with Russian Apparatus
Huby's network is not only constituted by physical movements but is rooted in formal affiliations with organizations that serve as operational arms of Russian power. Huby is a member of the Russian Geographical Society (RGO), an institution that, despite its academic name, is closely controlled by the Kremlin.5
The RGO has Vladimir Putin as chairman of the board of directors and Sergei Shoigu, former Defense Minister, as president.5 The organization is known to cooperate closely with Russian armed forces and intelligence, using expeditions and research projects as cover for geostrategic activities. Not being subject to Western sanctions, the RGO continues to operate in Europe, organizing events in cities like Vienna and Budapest, offering figures like Huby a legal platform to interact with Russian apparatus.5
Beyond the RGO, Huby maintained regular contacts with Russian diplomatic and academic circles, participating in events such as the World Policy Conference (WPC) in 2023 and 2024, where he was seen interacting with professors and directors of MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations).5 MGIMO is considered the main recruitment pool for the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR) and the GRU. Huby's ability to navigate these circles, combined with his activity as an investor and consultant for startups and companies in engineering, finance, and logistics sectors, outlines a profile of an "insider" capable of facilitating flows of information and sensitive contacts between Brussels, Paris, and Moscow.3
The Intimidation Campaign Against Valérie Urbain
Huby's activity took on threatening contours starting in May 2024, coinciding with Valérie Urbain's appointment as CEO of Euroclear and with the acceleration of European plans for the use of profits from Russian assets.5 According to several documented testimonies, Huby allegedly attempted to act as a "postman" on behalf of Russian intelligence, exerting increasing psychological pressure on the new CEO.
The Threat of Officers in Geneva
Shortly after her appointment on May 7, 2024, Huby approached Urbain during a high-level meeting. On that occasion, he showed her on his phone photographs of two high-ranking Russian intelligence officers in military uniform, reporting that these "friends" wanted to meet her in Geneva.3 The implicit message was clear: the CEO of Euroclear was in the crosshairs of Russian security apparatus, and refusal to negotiate would entail personal consequences. Urbain, deeply shocked by the encounter, immediately sought protection from Belgian authorities.3
The "Revenge" Against Management
Huby's strategy was not limited to Urbain alone. In mid-2024, he approached another member of Euroclear's executive committee, asking him to meet his Russian intelligence contacts. Upon the executive's refusal, Huby formulated explicit threats, suggesting that the executive's house might "go up in flames" or that his pet might "die suddenly".3 Such tactics are characteristic of GRU psychological operations, aimed at striking the affective and private sphere to paralyze the decision-making capacity of institutional leaders.
The 2025 Incident and the Climate of Fear
The culmination of this pressure occurred in the first half of 2025. A senior Euroclear executive was involved in an episode of physical violence outside a public venue.5 After the incident, Huby allegedly contacted Valérie Urbain again, referencing the incident with a rhetorical question: "You don't want to end up like that too, do you?".5 This episode confirmed that the threats were not mere verbal warnings but were part of a coordinated campaign of physical and psychological intimidation orchestrated by Russian military intelligence (GRU).1
The Security Response and Institutional Limitations
Despite the gravity of the threats and the fact that the risk assessment for Urbain had been classified at the highest levels (three or four) by OCAM (the Belgian threat assessment coordination body), the Belgian National Crisis Center initially denied official police escort to the CEO, without providing public reasons.3
This decision highlighted a systemic vulnerability in Europe's response to hybrid threats: Belgian intelligence services (VSSE) declared themselves unable to effectively investigate Huby because he officially resided in France and Sweden, creating a jurisdictional gap that favored Russian operations.5
Faced with institutional inertia, Urbain had to provide for her own security and that of her family, hiring bodyguards from a Belgian private security company and subsequently relying on Amarante, a renowned French company specializing in close protection.3 For over a year, the CEO was constantly accompanied by armed escorts, a fact that testifies to the gravity of the situation and the level of alert reached within Euroclear.1
The Russian Doctrine of "Eternal Revenge" Against States and Companies
The campaign against Euroclear is not an isolated phenomenon but fits into a doctrine of global retaliation that the Kremlin has explicitly communicated to Belgian and European political leaders. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever publicly revealed that Moscow sent formal warnings that, if Russian assets were confiscated or used, Belgium and he personally would feel the effects "for eternity".1 This rhetoric of "eternal revenge" aims to discourage Western governments by creating a climate of permanent legal and physical uncertainty.
Threats to Sovereign States
The Belgian government has expressed strong reservations about the European Commission's plan to use Russian assets as collateral for loans to Ukraine (reparations loan), fearing retaliations that could destabilize the entire nation.2
| Type of Threat | Russian Retaliation Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Financial Instability | Collapse of confidence in the Euro as a reserve currency if central securities depositories (CSDs) are no longer perceived as safe2 |
| Insolvency Risk | Possible bankruptcy of Euroclear due to billion-dollar lawsuits in Russian and international courts2 |
| Nuclear Escalation | Kremlin rhetoric (Medvedev) evoking the use of nuclear weapons against Belgium in response to the "theft" of assets1 |
| Cyber-sabotage | Attacks on critical infrastructure, Belgian ports and airports, already detected during EU negotiations1 |
Threats to Companies and Shareholders
Threats against Euroclear extend to its operational and financial integrity. The Russian Central Bank has already initiated legal proceedings in Russia claiming damages of $230 billion against Euroclear, defining the freezing of funds as an act of "theft."1 Moscow has made clear that, in case of expropriation of its assets, it will respond with:
- Confiscation of Western Funds: The seizure of approximately 33 billion euros in funds of Western companies currently frozen in Russian banks.1
- Nationalization of Companies: Forced expropriation of subsidiaries of European and American companies still active in the Russian market, including banks and industrial companies.1
- Legal Actions in Third Jurisdictions: Attempts to seize assets of Euroclear or its clients in Russia-aligned countries through local court judgments.4
Threats to Individuals and Executives
The personal dimension of Russian revenge is the most insidious. Beyond Urbain, other Euroclear executives and Belgian Finance Ministry officials have been subject to surveillance and intimidation.1 The Russian strategy aims to create a sense of isolation among political decision-makers, suggesting that state guarantees are not sufficient to protect them from the reach of Russian secret services. This approach has fueled political divisions in Belgium, where some parties fear the country will be sacrificed on the altar of European solidarity without adequate collective protection against the risk of individual retaliation.13
Geopolitical Implications and Systemic Risk
The story of Olivier Huby and the threats to Euroclear highlights the fragility of Europe's financial architecture in the face of hostile state actors using "lawfare" and psychological violence as foreign policy instruments. Euroclear's position as manager of nearly all Russian assets frozen in Europe makes it a potential breaking point for Eurozone stability.1
The Dilemma of European Solidarity
Belgium, partly supported by Italy, has demanded guarantees that the financial and legal risks arising from the use of Russian funds be shared equally among all 27 EU member states.4 If Euroclear were to fail due to Russian judgments, the consequences for the global securities market would be catastrophic. Valérie Urbain has repeatedly emphasized that the proposal to use Russian assets could "create a very large imbalance" and amount to a de facto "confiscation," warning against political decisions that ignore the legal foundations of the financial system.2
The "Fifth Column" and Influence Networks
The Huby case also highlights the existence of what Western intelligence calls a "fifth column" of intellectuals and bankers infatuated with Russia or actively co-opted by its services.3 In France, in particular, there is a long tradition of respect for Russian power that can be exploited by the Kremlin to place figures like Huby in positions of influence.3 His ability to operate undisturbed, participating in international conferences and sitting on boards of critical financial subsidiaries, demonstrates how difficult it is for liberal democracies to balance freedom of movement and association with the need to protect their vital institutions from espionage and intimidation.3
Final Considerations on the Future of Financial Security
The documented threats by Olivier Huby against Valérie Urbain and the broader revenge campaign orchestrated by Russia against Euroclear represent a qualitative leap in Moscow's challenge to the West. It is no longer just a war of sanctions or propaganda, but a direct attack on the physical security of economic leaders and the stability of institutions that guarantee the functioning of global capitalism.1
The effectiveness of Russian intimidation is evident in the slowdown of European decision-making processes and the growing anxiety of Belgian authorities.1 However, the resilience shown by Urbain and the journalistic investigation that brought Huby's activities to light offer a way out: transparency and transnational intelligence coordination are the only tools capable of neutralizing intermediaries operating in the shadows.3
The future of Russian assets and the security of European financial executives will remain inextricably linked to the EU's ability to provide not only a solid legal basis for its actions but also a physical and political protection apparatus capable of responding blow for blow to the Kremlin's doctrine of "eternal revenge."1
Summary of Documented Evidence
| Category | Documented Details | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Olivier Huby Profile | Mfex co-founder, Mfex Board Member (Euroclear), Cold War diplomacy | 3 |
| Travel Frequency | 155 flights in 10 years (2015-2024); 14 after February 2022 | 3 |
| Russian Ties | RGO member (Putin/Shoigu), MGIMO contacts, suspected double agent | 3 |
| Threats to V. Urbain | Intelligence officers photos; post-bar incident threat; Geneva meeting pressure | 3 |
| Threats to Other Execs | House fire; pet death; physical violence | 3 |
| Assets at Risk | 193-210 billion € in Russian sovereign funds at Euroclear | 1 |
| State Retaliation | "Consequences for eternity" against Belgium and Bart De Wever | 1 |
| Legal Actions | $230 billion damage claim by the Russian Central Bank | 1 |
This analysis concludes that Olivier Huby's operations cannot be reduced to a series of private interests in the art field but must be framed as an integral part of the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare effort aimed at preserving its sovereign assets through coercion of European financial leaders.1
Bibliography
- Belgian politicians and finance bosses targeted by Russian intelligence - The Guardian
- EU leaders weigh using frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine - WSB Radio
- Bolshoi-loving banker threatened Euroclear CEO, amid EU talks on Russian assets - EUobserver
- Russia Launches Intimidation Campaign in Belgium to Block Use of Frozen Assets - United24 Media
- French banker tied to Russia threatened Euroclear CEO, investigation finds - NV.ua