The Logistics Machine of the Russian Shadow Fleet

An investigation into the network of European and international companies keeping the Kremlin's shadow fleet operational

The Yantar is internationally known as a sophisticated Russian spy ship, officially registered as an oceanographic research vessel but equipped for underwater intelligence. Thanks to its cutting-edge instrumentation, it can map the seabed with extreme precision and, most importantly, operate on the fiber-optic cables that carry global internet traffic. Its presence near critical infrastructure often triggers alerts due to the risk of sabotage or the interception of sensitive data.

An investigation into the network of European and international companies keeping the Kremlin's shadow fleet operational, circumventing Western sanctions

While the West imposes increasingly stringent sanctions on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, a vast network of companies, financial intermediaries, and maritime service providers continues to ensure the operability of what has become known as the Russian "shadow fleet." This investigation documents how companies based in Dubai, Hong Kong, the Baltic States, and even Greece have built the infrastructure that allows the Kremlin to export billions of dollars worth of oil, thus financing the war machine against Ukraine.

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The Architecture of the Shadow Fleet

The Russian shadow fleet today comprises between 600 and 1,400 vessels, according to estimates from the Kyiv School of Economics and other monitoring organizations. These ships transport approximately 70% of Russian oil exports, generating estimated revenues between 87 and 100 billion dollars per year — a figure that equals or exceeds the total value of economic and military assistance provided to Ukraine since the war began.

Managing this fleet is not an isolated activity but requires complex infrastructure involving logistics, finance, and maritime services. Each vessel continues to depend on a support network that ensures its daily operability, despite the sanctions regime.

The Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfer System

The most documented technique for concealing cargo origin is ship-to-ship transfer. Key locations such as the Gulf of Laconia in Greece and waters off Ceuta in Spain have been identified as major hubs for these operations.

The support mechanism involves a Russian tanker transferring oil to an unsanctioned "receiving" vessel. This process requires the presence of a local service provider who supplies fenders, pumping equipment, and specialized technical personnel to manage the open-sea mooring. According to an analysis by the U.S. Naval Institute, STS transfer areas identified in the Mediterranean and Black Sea include the Laconic Gulf, Hurd's Bank near Malta, an area off Ceuta, and suspect zones off the coast.

The Shell Company Network

Dubai: The Center of the System

Documentary support passes through a sophisticated network of management companies based primarily in Dubai, Hong Kong, and Istanbul, but with technical ties in Europe. Investigations conducted by Bloomberg and Western intelligence agencies have revealed that Russian intelligence agencies are responsible for the industrial-scale creation of shell companies in jurisdictions such as Dubai, Hong Kong, and the Seychelles.

Companies sanctioned for managing vessels in the shadow fleet include:

Voliton DMCC (United Arab Emirates)
Bellatrix Energy Limited (Hong Kong)
Covart Energy Limited (Hong Kong)
Sun Ship Management (Dubai) - Sovcomflot subsidiary
Matias Ship Management (Dubai)
Nur Global Shipping (Dubai)

Many of these companies are created specifically to operate one or two vessels, and their nominee directors, as in the case of Nikhil Ganesh Ghorpade (a photojournalist with no maritime experience), lack any expertise in the energy sector. Vessels that previously belonged to Sovcomflot, the Russian state shipping company, have been transferred to companies in the United Arab Emirates to conceal their origin.

The Baltic Case: FB Trade and Fast Bunkering

An investigation conducted by LRT (Lithuanian national broadcaster), 15min, Eesti Ekspress, and Nekā personīga revealed one of the most significant support networks for the shadow fleet, centered in the Baltic States.

The Bunker Vessels: Rina and Zircone

Between June 2024 and March 2025, the bunker (refueling) vessels Rina and Zircone conducted 286 ship-to-ship operations, refueling 177 tankers with oil and petroleum products. Of these, at least 159 had called at Russian ports shortly before or after the transfers.

According to analysis by Anatolii Kravtsev of the Kyiv School of Economics, at the time Rina and Zircone supplied fuel, at least 20 of those tankers showed clear signs of belonging to the Russian shadow fleet: they lacked insurance coverage from any member of the International Group of P&I Clubs, and their owners and management companies were registered outside Oil Price Cap Coalition jurisdictions. Over nearly 10 months, the two vessels refueled them at least 30 times.

The Opaque Ownership Structure

The investigation traced the ownership of Rina and Zircone to FB Trade, a Dubai-registered company. Digging deeper, ultimate ownership leads to Fast Bunkering (Baltic Sea Bunkering), an Estonian company founded by Aleksei Tšulets, one of Estonia's richest men.

Fast Bunkering subsidiaries and other companies linked to Tšulets operate in the ports of Riga and Klaipėda. Entities linked to Tšulets also fully own the port of Paldiski Nord in Estonia. In 2023, Estonian authorities opened an investigation into one of his subsidiaries, NT Bunkering, on suspicion of falsifying documents labeling Russian fuel as Kazakh.

The vessel sale structure was architected through the Latvian company Welton Enterprises SIA, originally registered in 2018 as SIA Rent Flat, then changed to SIA YOLA in 2019 and became FB Shipping in 2023. Despite reporting virtually zero revenues, the company managed to spend a total of 6.3 million euros to purchase the vessels Rina, Zircone, and another NT Bunkering vessel, Onyx.

Shadow Fleet Insurance Coverage

Every vessel requires class certification and insurance to enter certain ports or cross strategic straits. Since the main insurers of the International Group of P&I Clubs are subject to sanctions, the shadow fleet turns to Russian or "friendly" country insurers.

Russian Insurers

A Kyiv School of Economics report identifies the main P&I insurance providers for the shadow fleet:

Ingosstrakh - sanctioned by USA and UK, considered the most important Russian provider but does not disclose its coverage
AlfaStrakhovanie - sanctioned by EU, USA, and UK
VSK - sanctioned by UK for enabling the shadow fleet
Sogaz - provides coverage with little transparency

These insurers are reinsured by Russian National Reinsurance Co. (RNRC), which depends on the Russian central bank, effectively putting Russia itself on the line for payments. This raises questions about what would happen if something serious occurred off the coast of a country Moscow considers "hostile."

In 2024, only 29.4% of tankers carrying Russian crude and 56.2% of tankers carrying Russian petroleum products had IG (International Group) coverage. This contrasts sharply with vessels carrying only non-Russian cargo, over 90% of which were IG-insured.

Tanker Sales by European Shipowners

An international investigation conducted by Follow the Money, OCCRP, and journalists from over a dozen news organizations revealed that Western shipowners earned over 6.3 billion dollars selling hundreds of obsolete tankers that became part of the shadow fleet.

Greek Dominance

More than half of the tankers identified in the investigation were sold by 54 Greek companies for a total of at least 3.7 billion dollars. Greek shipowners sold 127 of the 230 total vessels identified, representing 55% of all sales investigated worldwide.

Prominent Greek companies involved include:

Tsakos Energy Navigation - sold the vessel Aris for 21 million dollars, which was then renamed Canis Power and began transporting Russian oil
Marla Tankers - sold two 15-year-old tankers for 84 million dollars in 2024
Toro Corp (Cyprus-based) - resold six obsolete tankers for 195.4 million dollars in 2023 and early 2024, earning 111.7 million
Prime Marine - involved in selling vessels that ended up in the shadow fleet
Thenamaris - multiple vessels operated by this Athens-based company have been attacked in the Mediterranean

According to Bloomberg data, Greek shipping companies remain the single largest supplier of vessels to the shadow fleet, and Western European operators as a whole provide two-thirds of the shadow fleet's transport capacity. Nearly 60% of vessels were sold by Western European owners, with Greek owners by far the largest single sellers.

Supply and Port Services

Even if a vessel is sanctioned, it needs fuel (bunkering), water, provisions, and medical assistance for the crew. Often refueling occurs via dedicated tankers operating in international waters, avoiding docking at a port where control would be stricter.

A local maritime agency can facilitate crew changes or delivery of mail and documents via small service vessels that reach the ship at the edge of territorial waters. Although international rules allow exceptions for refueling vessels carrying Russian oil, strict legal conditions apply: bunkering companies must conduct thorough checks, maintain transparent documentation, and comply with all legal standards.

Maintenance and Spare Parts

Extraordinary maintenance represents the fleet's weak point. Many Russian vessels use European-made engines, such as Wärtsilä or MAN. Support is guaranteed through the black market or commercial triangulations that see spare parts transit through Central Asian countries before reaching the maintenance port in Russia or a compliant shipyard.

A European company can provide consulting or management software to a foreign counterpart that, formally, appears to be the shadow vessel's shipowner. The use of "front companies" allows purchasing original spare parts from Western manufacturers, declaring a final destination different from the real one.

Quantitative Data on the Shadow Fleet

Parameter	Value	Source
Estimated number of vessels	600-1,400	KSE, Wikipedia
Russian oil transport	3.7 million barrels/day (70%)	CSIS, KSE
Estimated annual revenues	$87-100 billion	CSIS
Vessels aged >15 years	~72%	CSIS
Uninsured vessels	~60%	CSIS
Sales by European shipowners	$6.3 billion (230 vessels)	FTM, OCCRP
Sales by Greek shipowners	$3.7 billion (127 vessels)	FTM, Solomon

Conclusions

The effectiveness of the shadow fleet depends entirely on the shipowner's ability to maintain this logistical "lifeline" active. Without technical support for at-sea transfers and the complicity of financial intermediaries, the economic sustainability of such an operation would be drastically reduced.

The evidence documented in this investigation reveals a complex and layered network of actors who, operating on the margins of legality or deliberately exploiting gaps in the sanctions system, allow the Kremlin to continue generating billions in revenues from the oil trade. This logistical machine involves:

Shell companies registered in Dubai, Hong Kong, and the Seychelles that obscure the true ownership of vessels
Bunkering service providers in the Baltic States that systematically refuel shadow fleet vessels
Russian insurers that provide opaque and potentially inadequate coverage
European shipowners, mainly Greek, who have sold hundreds of obsolete tankers for billions of dollars
Ship-to-ship transfer operators in international waters that allow masking the origin of oil

As long as this infrastructure continues to operate, the Western sanctions regime will remain partially ineffective, allowing Russia to finance its war of aggression against Ukraine. Only coordinated and determined action by the European Union, the United States, and their allies — striking simultaneously at all nodes of this logistical network — can break the chain of support for the Kremlin's shadow fleet.

The Collaborationists

🛰️ OSINT Tool: Monitor the Shadow Fleet in Real Time

The Architecture of the Shadow Fleet

The Ship-to-Ship (STS) Transfer System

The Shell Company Network

Dubai: The Center of the System

The Baltic Case: FB Trade and Fast Bunkering

The Bunker Vessels: Rina and Zircone

The Opaque Ownership Structure

Shadow Fleet Insurance Coverage

Russian Insurers

Tanker Sales by European Shipowners

Greek Dominance

Supply and Port Services

Maintenance and Spare Parts

Quantitative Data on the Shadow Fleet

Conclusions

Bibliography and Sources

Institutional Documents and Reports

Investigative Reports

Technical and Sector Analysis

Academic Sources

Insurance and Legal Sources

Intelligence and Security Sources

General News Sources

Online Resources and Databases